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Kindness
Stephen Rowland, Institute of Education, University of London, UK*
Students readily see kindness as a mark of the good teacher. Yet the concept 
of kindness is singularly silent in accounts of teaching excellence, student 
satisfaction or professional values. It seems to have little place in a world 
driven by competitive individualism.
Many see the financial ‘crash’ to have been the consequence of such narrow 
competitive self interest in the economic world, whose values have extended 
well beyond the world of finance. Writing in the London Review of Books, 
John Lanchester shows how the ‘economic metaphor’, which has come to 
apply to every aspect of modern life, including education, has failed. As a 
consequence, he says, ‘we need to rediscover other sources of value’ 
(Lanchester 2009: 13). 
There are good reasons for understanding kindness to be a natural 
predisposition.  In fact, the word ‘kind’ has the same etymological roots as 
‘kin’, ‘kindred’ (family) and ‘kind’ (‘type’). This is suggestive of a natural 
relationship of kindness between members of the same family, group or 
species.  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2007) gives the first 
definition of ‘kindly’ as ‘existing or occurring according to the laws of nature’, 
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thus implying that kindness is natural. Stoic philosophy celebrated the natural 
order as a basis of its ethics. Thus the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, a 
leading Stoic philosopher, speaks of kindness as ‘mankind’s greatest delight’ 
(Philips and Taylor 2009: 18).
Might kindness therefore be a ‘natural’ source of value in need of 
rediscovery?
In their recent book On Kindness, psychoanalyst Adam Philips and feminist 
historian Barbara Taylor (2009) give an historical account of how we have 
come to under-value kindness in a social context in which people are 
fundamentally antagonistic towards each other.  
From an educational perspective, and drawing on Lyotard’s ‘report on 
knowledge’, with its concept of the ‘terrors of performativity’ (1984), Stephen 
Ball and others have analysed how a culture of surveillance and audit have 
led practitioners to ‘find their values challenged or displaced by the terrors of 
performativity’ (Ball 2003: 216). Kindness is one such displaced value. A love 
of knowledge and a concern for social justice are others. 
It is vital that we are able to speak about such values as kindness in our 
professional lives. To do so might give us hope in a situation where the 
critiques which Ball and others have offered are so apposite. It might also play 
a part in following Lanchester’s project to ‘rediscover other sources of value’ 
other than the economic ones which prevail.
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But speaking (or writing) about kindness in the context of research, or indeed 
any discussion of education, brings about embarrassment. Such 
embarrassment signifies a transgression of accepted boundaries: what Mary 
Douglas (1966) calls ‘matter out of place’. ‘Kindness’ is ‘out of place’ in talk 
about education. It can suggest a sentimental and unrigorous approach, take 
us into fields better addressed by therapy, indicate fanciful new-ageism, and 
so on. Or in the attempt to avoid such dangers routinisation becomes the 
consequence of the application of reductive logic. The critical function of 
‘reflection’, for example has, in some areas of professional training, been 
largely reduced to a trivial training mantra by the application of such logic. In 
the same way kindness - ‘mankind’s greatest delight’ and a basis for ethics – 
might be transformed to a mere transferable skill. That’s how performativity 
works.
Risk is not only involved in writing about kindness, but in the kind act itself. A 
journal editor colleague recently told me how he followed up his rejection 
letter to an unsuccessful contributor with a more personal communication in 
which he outlined some ideas about how she might develop her writing. It did 
not take a great effort on his part but, although she was unknown to him, he 
guessed she would be distraught that her writing had been received with 
much criticism; he wanted to help. In taking this unusual step, he was anxious 
that his ‘advice’ may seem patronizing, or that it might soften a critique of her 
writing from which she might learn, or that he was simply stepping 
inappropriately outside his role as editor. From her reply it appeared, 
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however, that his fears were unfounded and his advice was gratefully 
received. But he might have got it wrong. I’m sure I have often sent students 
down the wrong track with the best of intentions. 
Meeting the needs of someone else is not at all straightforward. Sometimes 
having to ‘be cruel to be kind’ warns us, perhaps, that the kindest teacher is 
not necessarily the one who receives the highest satisfaction ratings. But nor 
should we assume that we know what students need better than they do. 
Boswell’s adage that ‘the path to Hell is paved with good intentions’ also 
warns us that the kindness of a deed is not assured by kindly intentions alone. 
But this is no excuse for cynically ignoring the prompts of conscience.
The legal concept of ‘due care’ and the associated business concept of ‘due 
diligence’ are attempts to avoid such difficulties by placing care within a set of 
professional requirements or standards. In the same vain, ethics committees 
attempt to simplify complex ethical judgement by the application of rules. But 
kindness always goes beyond any such requirement. My colleague’s original 
reject letter to the unsuccessful writer fulfilled all the requirements for due 
care. No more was required in his role as editor. The follow up letter, together 
with its attendant risks and the unpredictability of its outcome, constituted a 
small act of kindness. It was ‘beyond the call of duty’; he could not have been 
held to account for omitting to do this. But he would, it appeared, have held 
himself to account had he failed to. While one can be held to account for a 
lack of due care, one cannot be held to account for a lack of kindness.
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The difference between being held to account and holding oneself to account 
is crucial. It involves alienation and responsibility. Only when holding myself to 
account am I acting with human agency. It is, of course, important that 
teachers, doctors, and other public servants are held to account by the public 
they serve. The problem arises when this requirement leads to a substitution 
of a personal quality, kindness, by a public one, a duty of care. As a teacher I 
am rightly held to account for exercising a duty of care to my students. But, if I 
am to maintain my humanity, it seems that I have to hold myself to account for 
my exercise of kindness. While I can be held to account for my exercise of 
professional values, I can only hold my self to account for the expression of 
my personal or human values. 
 
The nature of the connection between kindness and teaching rests in the fact 
that both kindly acts and pedagogical acts require the actor to identify with the 
concerns of the other.  In serving the needs of the student, the good teacher 
attempts to see things from the student’s perspective. This is an essential 
prerequisite of kindness too. My colleague’s follow up letter was kind not 
simply because he would thereby lessen the painfulness of the original 
rejection letter, but because he identified with the writer’s developmental 
needs. His act was kind inasmuch as it was pedagogically sound. But it was 
dangerous inasmuch as he was stepping outside the bounds of his normal 
editorial responsibility. Even as a teacher, one can never actually adopt the 
learner’s perspective. 
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Another difficulty with kindness is its confusion with leniency. In wanting a kind 
teacher does the student really want one who will be lenient, soft, prepared to 
overlook errors and shallowness of thought? In wanting to be kind is the 
teacher really motivated by the learner’s needs, or simply avoiding 
responsibility for the student’s confrontation with the inevitable pain of 
learning?
With such inherent dangers it is perhaps not surprising that kindness, as a 
virtue, became associated with safety of domestic rather than working life, 
and thus feminized. Philips and Taylor demonstrate that kindness, which had 
previously played a central role in public morality, was displaced and 
downgraded as a consequence of industrialisation and the rise of 
Protestantism. By the early nineteenth century, it had become the prerogative 
of specific constituencies, such as clergymen, romantic poets and women 
(Philips and Taylor 2009:41). A Victorian stereotype comes to mind of the 
middle class father earning the income from the cut and thrust of industrial 
employment, while his wife keeps an atmosphere of kindness and safety in 
the home where children play (and learn) and to which the father returns for 
refreshment. The nostalgic paintings of William Powell Frith (1819-1909) 
celebrate such domesticated kindness and its contrast with industrial energy. 
Such a gendered version of kindness underpins institutional ideals of 
teaching. In a study of the relationships between teaching and research, 
heads of department in a research led university were asked what qualities 
they associated with successful teachers and researchers (Rowland 1996). 
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Respondents typically mentioned ‘drive’, ‘self-motivation’, ‘stickability’, 
‘confidence’ and the ability to ‘go out into the world and get it’ as typical of the 
successful researcher. Good teachers, in contrast, were represented by the 
more ‘feminine’ qualities of ‘openness’, ‘care’ and ‘concern for students’. The 
distinction is redolent of the industrial and domestic worlds portrayed by 
Frith’s paintings. Since 1996, when this study was reported, quality assurance 
systems have further transformed the ‘domestic’ space of teaching into the 
public space of work. As teaching performance becomes increasingly 
accountable, so the personal quality of kindness is replaced by more 
manageable routines of ‘due care’.
Kindness, however, extends beyond the private domestic sphere and is not 
limited to public performative function. There was nothing soft or domesticated 
about Aurelius’s celebration of kindness as ‘mankind’s greatest delight’. In his 
Stoic philosophy justice was natural and a consequence of the exercise of 
reason. As such it was the primary virtue to which kindness and the other 
virtues naturally contributed (Aurelius 167: paragraph IX). 
Kindness as a public virtue, built upon a commitment to social justice, 
embraces critique. In educational research the term ‘critical friend’ is used by 
action researchers to describe the relationship between co-enquirers (be they 
researchers or students) who share a commitment to social justice. It 
combines the kindness of friendship with the critique of the educator. 
Developed in relation to practitioner research in schools, by such writers as 
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John Elliott (1985) and Wilf Carr (1986), its theoretical roots are traced back to 
Critical Theory.   
Through such resources we might begin to rediscover an educational concept 
of kindness which resists both nostalgic sentimentalization and the tendency 
to routinization that characterize much professional life. Just as intellectual 
love can be seen to underlie the relationship between learner and subject 
matter (Rowland 2008), so might the opportunity for kindness be a significant 
dimension of educational relationships. 
To what extent are our institutional contexts open to, and conducive of, acts of 
kindness? In what ways do students expect kindness from their teachers? Is 
this a value which teachers hold to be important in their work?  Such 
questions are open to empirical investigation as part of an attempt to 
rediscover the ethical value of kindness in educational work and move beyond 
the worn out economic model that has come to dominate our working lives. 
*I would like to thank Sue Clegg and colleagues at the Centre for Research 
into Higher Education, Leeds Metropolitan University, who are collaborating in 
the development of these ideas.
References
Aurelius Antonius, M. 167 A.C.E. The Meditations, Book XI, trans. George 
Long. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
8
Carr,W. and Kemmis, S. 1986. Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and  
Action Research. London: Falmer Press. 
Ball, S. J. 2003. The Teacher’s Soul and the Terrors of Performativity, 
Journal of Education Policy, Vol. 18, no. 2: 215-228.
Douglas, M. 1966. Purity and Danger: an analysis of the concepts of 
pollution and taboo, purity and danger. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Elliott, J, 1985. Facilitating Action-Research in Schools: Some Dilemmas. In 
Field Methods in the Study of Education, ed R. Burgess, 35-262. London and 
Philadelphia: The Falmer Press.
Lanchester, J. 2009. It’s finished, London Review of Books, 28 May, 3-16.
Lyotard, J. F. 1984. The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge ,Vol. 
10. Manchester: Manchester University Press.         
Phillips, A. and Taylor, B. 2009. On Kindness. London: Penguin.
Rowland, S. 1996. Relationships Between Teaching and Research, Teaching 
in Higher Education, 1, no. 1: 7-20.
Rowland, S. 2008. Collegiality and Intellectual Love, British Journal of 
Sociology of Education, 29, no. 3: 353-60.
9
